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COMMENTARY

How TO CREATE AMERICAN

MANUFACTURING JOBS

By John Dewar GleissnerI
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote that a nation's
prosperity depends upon "the skill, dexterity, and judgment
with which its labour is generally applied," and upon the
2
proportion of the population employed in useful labor.
Economists watch measures of productivity and
employment closely. The unemployment rate is today the
single most prominent measure of economic health. By
these basic criteria, the incarcerated, approximately 2.24
million able-bodied Americans, 3 more idle prisoners than
any other nation, constitute a gigantic drain on the
economy. Very few prisoners produce marketable goods or
services.4 Most inmate labor is simply "prison housework"
1 B.A. with honor, Auburn University, 1973 (Psychology); J.D.,
Vanderbilt Law School, 1977; Practicing attorney since 1977; Author,
PRISON & SLAVERY-A SURPRISING COMPARISON (2010; 438 pages);

Prison Overcrowding Cure: Judicial Corporal Punishment of Adults,
49 CRIM. L. BULL. (Summer 2013); Blog Host, Incarceration Reform
Mega-Site. This piece represents the author's assessment of the U.S.
prison population and economy, and opinions should be recognized as
such. Uncited material may be found in the author's aforementioned
book.
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS I (Edwin Cannan & George J. Stigler eds., Univ.

of Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
3 LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, 8 (2012),

available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4537.
4 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC. ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 2012, 5 (2012) ("FPI has industrial and service operations
1

Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 167
(i.e. helping operate the correctional institution) or the
making of selected goods for the government; only a small
fraction of prisoners work in factories or on farms, ranches,
or roads. Very low employment and productivity in federal
and state prisons is invariably proven by dividing total
annual correctional industry revenue by the particular
prison population. Prison industries often operate at a loss
and inefficiently utilize prison labor.5 What prisoners
might be earning under full employment in the private
sector equals or exceeds the direct costs of maintaining
more than two million prisoners.
Prison problems are not new. Prominent political
leader and diplomat William Eden, Baron Auckland, wrote
as follows in his 1771 treatise Principles of Penal Law:
"Imprisonment, inflicted by law as a punishment, is not
according to the principles of wise legislation. It sinks
useful subjects into burdens on the community, and has
always a bad effect on their morals: nor can it communicate
the benefit of example, being in its nature secluded from
the eye of the people." 6 When American prisons began, it
was immediately recognized that prisoners should work.
The vastly increased negative economic impacts brought
about by massive incarceration are relatively new in

at 81 factories located at 63 prison facilities representing approximately
8% of the work eligible inmate population as of September 30, 2012."
5 Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor
and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 857, 890 n.144 (2008).
6
WILLIAM EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 44-45 (1771).

GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM INTHE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN
7

FRANCE 23 (Francis Lieber trans., Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1833)

("Labour gives to the solitary cell an interest; it fatigues the body and
relieves the soul.").

2
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historical terms and have not yet been adequately addressed
by legislation.
A predicate for prison reform today is a thorough
understanding of the economic and social costs caused by
the current inefficient incarceration regime. No one has
successfully computed all the various direct, indirect,
social, and collateral costs of massive incarceration. The
value of moving offenders back into the workforce,
restoring manufacturing jobs, and reducing government
expenses and recidivism cannot be denied.
Brief History of U.S. Prison Industries and
Labor. "The earliest forms of prison industries work
programs date back to the late 1700s. Interestingly, many
of the dilemmas we face [t]oday, also challenged our
predecessors: the elimination of inmate idleness, program
self-sufficiency, the overall safety and security of our
prison system, and productive inmate employment without
undue impact upon private sector jobs."8
In the 1800s, several state prison systems were selfsupporting, ran at a profit, and informed their legislatures
that further appropriations would not be necessary.
Productive prison labor under the draconian Auburn
System created profits during three generations of the
remarkable Pilsbury family. Moses C. Pilsbury, Amos
Pilsbury, and Louis D. Pilsbury successfully managed
prisons and prison systems in New Hampshire,
Connecticut, and New York. The Pilsbury System, a type
of Auburn System, paid the cost of running a prison and, in
addition, paid money to the state treasury. Prison labor
made a profit to offset the costs of confinement, saving the
taxpayers money. Zebulon R. Brockway, the father of
'

FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES,

INC.

available
(2009),
4
2008,
www.datachieve.com.php5-6.dfwl-1.websitetestlink.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/CATAR2008.pdf.

at

FED. PRISON INDUS.,
REPORT
ANNUAL

INC.,

3
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rehabilitative penology and an admirer of the Pilsburys and
Andrew Maconochie, produced profits more than four
times greater than the entire cost of running a penal
institution. 9 In 1888, the reformatory run by Brockway
claimed that 78.5% of its parolees were living orderly and
self-supporting lives.10
In his 1912 book Fifty Years of Prison Service: An
Autobiography, Zebulon Brockway outlined an ideal prison
Brockway said prisoners should support
system.
themselves in prison through industry in anticipation of
supporting themselves outside prison; outside businesses
and labor unions must not interfere; indeterminate
sentences were required, making prisoners earn their
release with constructive behavior, not just the passage of
time; and education and a Christian culture should be
imparted. Brockway opposed releasing prisoners who
Zebulon
would clearly poison the outside world.
Brockway's ideal prison system followed the procedures of
Wethersfield Prison in Connecticut when Amos Pilsbury
was its warden. Brockway believed prisoners would work
effectively to defray the expenses of their penal institutions
if given a share of the profits. The profit motive makes
people work much harder and smarter than if they are
forced to work.
Everyone agreed prisoners would be better off if
In 1886, the
they worked usefully while in prison."
REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST,
POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 17769

1941, 177-79 (2008).
10 ZEBULON REED BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 297 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1912).
" This is still the case. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS §

8:1 (4th ed. 2013) ("The value of productive prison work and its
relationship to rehabilitation are widely accepted."); Stefanie Evans,
Making More Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented
Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521 (2000).

4
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Second Annual Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor
stated that "[i]t is universally conceded that convicts should
be employed at some useful labor."' 2 "Certainly no
thoughtful, humane person, and most assuredly no trade
unionist, wants the inmates of our prisons to remain idle,"
labor leader Samuel Gompers wrote a century ago.13
American prison labor systems through the years have
included lease, contract, piece-price, public account, state
use, and public works labor systems, none of which were
wholly private or agreed to by the convicts.' 4
From their inception, affected businesses and labor
fought prison industries. Legislation and constitutional
provisions were aimed at the discredited convict leasing
and convict contract labor systems opposed by
progressives.' 5 Private industries and labor feared low-cost
prison labor and successfully pushed for debilitating legal
restrictions upon private prison industries.
State and
federal laws began prohibiting and restricting the sale of
prison-made goods. In 1890, for example, the State of
Washington prohibited private employment of prison labor
in its constitution and mandated such labor for the benefit
of the state. 16 Opponents of prison industries and labor
12 BUREAU OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
SECOND ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 1886: CONVICT LABOR

(1887).
13 SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE 110 (1919),

quoted in Stephen P. Garvey, FreeingPrisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 339, 369 (1998).
14 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 503-07

(11th ed. 1992).
' Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 61
(Wash. 2004).
16Id. at 45, 58 (Even though "[t]he benefits of providing employment
opportunities for convicts [were] not in dispute," a state constitutional
provision, article II, section 29 of the Washington state constitution,
prohibited employment of prisoners by private enterprise.: "After [Jan.
1, 1890], the labor of convicts of this state shall not be let out by
5
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made the valid point that government-supported industries
are not fair competition. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
that "[f]ree labor, properly compensated, cannot compete
successfully with the enforced and unpaid or underpaid
convict labor of the prison."' 7
Private prison industries came to a screeching halt
at the time of the Great Depression. The Hawes-Cooper
Act of 1929, "[a]n Act to divest goods, wares and
merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined by convicts
or prisoners of their interstate character in certain cases,"
took away the interstate commerce status of prison-made
goods, allowing states to bar them from sale.
That all goods, wares, and
merchandise, manufactured,
produced, or mined, wholly
or in part, by convicts or.
prisoners, except convicts or
prisoners on parole or
probation, or in any penal
reformatory
and/or
except
institutions,
commodities manufactured in
and
penal
Federal
correctional institutions for
Federal
the
by
use
Government, transported into
any State or Territory of the
United States and remaining
therein for use, consumption,
sale, or storage, shall upon
contract to any person, copartnership, company or corporation, and the
legislature shall by law provide for the working of convicts for the
benefit of the state.").
17Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 439 (1936).

6
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arrival and delivery in such
State or Territory be subject
to the operation and effect of
the laws of such State or
Territory to the same extent
and in the same manner as
though such goods, wares,
and merchandise had been
manufactured, produced, or
mined in such State or
Territory, and shall not be
exempt therefrom by reason
of being introduced in the
or
package
original
otherwise.18
Many states rohibited the sale of those goods. In
Whitfield v. Ohio, 9 the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of an Ohio seller of prison-made work shirts
shipped to Ohio from an Alabama prison, noting that "the
sale of convict-made goods in competition with the
products of free labor is an evil" recognized by states and
the federal government. 20 There was no discrimination
because Ohio barred its own prisons from selling such
goods on the open market.21 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that discriminated

Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929, ch. 79, 45 Stat. 1084 . This provision is
no longer explicitly codified as written to make the goods "subject to
the operation and effect of the laws of such State" (words borrowed
from the Wilson Act regarding liquor), but the general structure of
discouraging interstate commerce remains in somewhat confusing
structure.
19 297 U.S. 431.
20 Whitfield, 297 U.S. at 439.
21 Whitfield, 297 U.S. at 437.
18

7
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against convict-made goods from out of state by not
22
similarly barring sales of Wisconsin convict-made goods.
In this depressed era of super-high unemployment,
Congress was in its damaging, protectionist Smoot-Hawley
mood.23 The Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935, as amended in
24
1940, limited interstate shipment of prisoner-made goods.
In Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co., the Supreme Court upheld the Ashurst-Sumners Act,
saying that "[t]he Congress in exercising the power
confided to it by the Constitution is as free as the states to
recognize the fundamental interests of free labor." 25 in
1936, the Walsh-Healey Act banned convict labor on
federal procurement contracts. 26 While these restrictive
statutes were passed by perceiving evil, valid exercises of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and were
passed in a time of high unemployment, they were directly
contrary to the letter and spirit of provisions mandating
interstate commerce in the U.S.
unencumbered
27
Constitution, nearly every other law Congress passed
State v. Whitfield, 257 N.W. 601 (Wis. 1934).
The Tariff Act of 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, raised U.S. tariffs
on imported goods, brought retaliatory tariffs, reduced American
exports and imports, and infamously increased the severity of the Great
Depression. See Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Monetary Policy and the Global Economy (Mar. 25,
at
available
(transcript
2013)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130325a.
htm).
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (2006).
25 299 U.S. § 334 (1937).
26 41 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006) ("(3) INELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES.-No . . .
incarcerated individual will be employed by the contractor in the
manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment
under the contract, except that this section, or other law or executive
order containing similar prohibitions against the purchase of goods by
the Federal Government, does not apply to convict labor that satisfies
the conditions of section 1761(c) of title 18.").
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
22
23

8
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regarding the scope of interstate commerce, and free trade
principles expressed in later treaties with foreign nations.
"Prison labor, once viewed as indispensable for
restoring a healthy relationship between the criminal and
society, was made literally a federal offense." 2 8 These
trade barriers in the form of criminal statutes are still
codified, with changes through the years, in state and
federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) now states as follows:
(a)
Whoever knowingly
transports
in
interstate
commerce or from any
foreign country into the
United States any goods,
merchandise
or
wares,
manufactured, produced, or
mined, wholly or in part by
convicts or prisoners, except
convicts or prisoners on
parole, supervised release, or
probation, or in any penal or
reformatory institution, shall
be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.29
In other words, manufacturing was limited to the
prison; each state could bar private businesses from their
prisons, which most did; and each state could ban the sale
of prison-made goods, which many did. Congress also

David Frum, Working for the Man, AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, at
49 (quoting Arizona Assistant Attorney General Andrew Peyton
Thomas).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (2006).
28

9
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made it a crime to ship prisoner-made goods without
obvious labeling and provided forfeiture as a penalty.
(a) All packages containing
or
wares,
goods,
any
merchandise manufactured,
produced, or mined wholly or
in part by convicts or
prisoners, except convicts or
prisoners on parole or
probation, or in any penal or
reformatory institution, when
shipped or transported in
foreign
or
interstate
commerce shall be plainly
and clearly marked, so that
the name and address of the
and
shipper, the name
address of the consignee, the
nature of the contents, and
the name and location of the
reformatory
or
penal
institution where produced
wholly or in part may be
readily ascertained on an
inspection of the outside of
such package. 30
(b) Whoever violates this
section shall be fined under
this title, and any goods,
merchandise
or
wares,
transported in violation of
this section or section 1761
30

18 U.S.C. § 1762(a) (2006).
10
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of this title shall be forfeited
to the United States, and may
be seized and condemned by
like proceedings as those
provided by law for the
seizure and forfeiture of
property imported into the
United States contrary to

law.31
In 1934, at the time private businesses were
effectively excluded from prison industries, Congress
created a government-owned monopoly over the federal
prison industries and labor, Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
(FPI), which uses the trade name UNICOR. FPI's mission
is to provide employment and training opportunities to
inmates confined in federal correctional facilities and to
provide market-priced, quality products and services to
other federal agencies. By law, FPI minimizes competition
with private industry and labor.
(a) Federal Prison Industries
shall determine in what
manner and to what extent
industrial operations shall be
carried on in Federal penal
and correctional institutions
for the
production
of
commodities for consumption
in such institutions or for sale
to the
departments
or
agencies of the United States,
but not for sale to the public

" 18 U.S.C. § 1762(b) (2006).
11
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in competition with private
enterprise. 32
Statutory passivity requires that FPI diversify its
activities and avoid obtaining excessive market shares. 33
Many state-sponsored correctional industries live by
the mandatory source preference requirements of their
respective governments, which restrict the purchasing
options of the sponsoring governments. When faced with a
similar situation at the federal level, private businesses
complained about the U.S. government's mandatory source
preference requirement in favor of FPI. Congress took
away FPI's status in several steps.3 4 The procurement law
was changed. Now federal agencies do not always have to
buy from FPI.35 But FPI can only sell to federal agencies,3 6
which greatly limits the types of products it can make. As
a result of losing its mandatory source preference, FPI is
losing money and prison jobs. Meanwhile, FPI does not
allow private companies to make goods in federal prisons,
blocking the exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) and 18
U.S.C. § 1762(a).
In testimony before Congress, FPI claimed that it
employed 25% of the federal prison population in 1998.37
FPI said that it provided jobs to 17% of the eligible federal
18 U.S.C. § 4122(a) (2006).
33 18 U.S.C. § 4122(b)(1)-(3) (2006).
32

34

NATHAN

JAMES,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

FEDERAL PRISON

(2011).
10 U.S.C. § 2410n (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 4122(b) (2006).

INDUSTRIES
35

36

3 Prison Industry Reform Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4100 and H.R.
2758 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 58-66 (1998) (statement of Kathleen Hawk Sawyer,
Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, and Chief Executive Officer,
Federal
Prison
Industries),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57231.000/hju572
31 Of.htm.
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prison population in 2008 and 8% in 2012.38 Thus, as the
prison population was skyrocketing, the percentage of
federal prisoners working dropped markedly. The outsized,
negative impact of the Great Recession on UNICOR
reflects a connection between prison industries,
government budgets, and, of course, the economy and
general labor market. 39
UNICOR claims that "[s]ince 1934, [UNICOR] is
one government program that truly works in every sense of
the word."4 0 UNICOR's very limited success under the
legal and economic impediments it faces 4 ' proves the
enormous economic and social boost a fully employed
prison force that operates freely in interstate and
international commerce while making profits and paying
taxes could provide. From 1934 to 2013, this federal
government monopoly, in terms of potential workers under
its control, grew exponentially. 42 "The federal budget for
38 FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., supra note 8, at 6, 16; OFFICE OF THE

INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 4, at 5 ("FPI has industrial and service
operations at 81 factories located at 63 prison facilities representing
approximately 8% of the work eligible inmate population as of
September 30, 2012.").
39 During major wars, prisoners generally are worked much harder and
more often than in peacetime, and releases from prison are more
common.
40 FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., supra note 8, at ii.

41 18 U.S.C § 4122 (2006); Coal. for Gov't Procurement v. Fed. Prison
Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2004) (detailing the limitations
imposed on Federal Prison Industries and prison industries generally).
42 In 1934, the federal prison population was about 12,000; in 2013, it
was 218,864. Compare Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons,FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last visited Oct. 8,
2013), with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES

1934, 3 (1934) (about 12,000); see also A Brief History of the Bureau
of Prisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, www.bop.gov/about/history.jsp

(last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (In 1930, there were "just over 13,000"
federal prisoners.).
13
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FY 2010 contained $6 billion for the Bureau of Prisons, an
increase 9 f 1,712% since 19 8 0 ."43 Since the 1970s, state
prison populations have grown more than 700%."
In 1979, Congress authorized a limited exception
through the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP), a federally sponsored program to
develop partnerships between private enterprise and prison
labor.
PIECP has proven successful in reducing
recidivism. 45 Under the program, which was created in
1979 and continued in 1990, prisoners must receive "wages
at a rate which is not less than that paid for work of a
similar nature in the locality in which the work was
performed." Because PIECP participants must pay the
prevailing wage in the area and meet seven other
requirements, only a tiny handful of offenders are involved.
However, this program merely "exchanges one debilitating
limit on prison labor for another." 46 PIECP inflexibly
requires employers to pay prevailing wages to a workforce
that, as a whole, is substandard in education, job skills,
43

THE SENTENCING

PROJECT, THE EXPANDING

FEDERAL PRISON

(2011),
asca.net/system/assets/attachments/28 11/incFederalPrisonFactsheet_
POPULATION

FED. BUREAU

March20112.pdf91304452236

(citing

BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE

SUMMARY-FEDERAL

OF PRISONS,

PRISON SYSTEM

(2011), available at justice.gov/jmd/201 1summary/html/fyl 1-bop-budsummary.htm).
44 CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 2

(2012),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price ofP
risons-updatedversion_072512.pdf.
45 Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, FactoriesBehind Fences: Do
Prison 'Real Work' ProgramsWork?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., June 2007,

at 32, 32-36.
46 Stephen P. Garvey, FreeingPrisoners'Labor,
50 STAN. L. REV. 339,
373 (1998); see also Coal. for Gov't Procurement, 365 F.3d 435
(dealing with multiple statutory restrictions on Federal Prison
Industries (UNICOR)).
14
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mental and physical health, sobriety, morality, human
relationships, industriousness, intelligence, security risk,
and general life experiences. "Paying prisoners the federal
The
minimum wage is economically unrealistic."4 7
prevailing wage requirement put on private businesses is
particularly onerous compared to what FPI pays its
workforce: "Inmates earn from $0.23 per hour up to a
maximum of $1.15 per hour, depending on their
proficiency and educational level, among other things."4 8
Historically, most prison authorities in America did
not work prisoners efficiently at hard labor in the nowpredominant "state-use" system. The state-use system
The
employs a small fraction of all prisoners.
indeterminate sentence was effectively squashed because,
at the time, there was little by which to encourage and
judge the productivity or rehabilitation of prisoners. State
ownership of prison industries invariably decreases burdens
on the taxpayers. But those government industries do not
pay taxes and usually require subsidies or preferences.
Modern reform efforts must address the unfairness
issue caused by state-supported prison labor. The solution
will be through the private sector, which more often creates
social good, by avoiding, minimizing, or eliminating unfair
competition with labor or businesses and by recognizing
the more menacing threat of foreign competition.
Economic Costs of Massive Incarceration. The
direct costs of massive incarceration include food, clothing,
shelter, transportation to and from detention, health careincluding mental health care, suicide watches, and
medicines-and extra legal expenses for about 2.25 million
people in or for the federal government and states, counties,
Alexander B. Wellen, Prisoners and the FLSA: Can the American
Taxpayer Afford Extending Prison Inmates the Federal Minimum
Wage?, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 333 (1994).
48 JAMES, supra note 34, at 3.
47

15
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and cities. Managing this high-risk population twenty-four
hours per day, every day, incurs enormous expenses for
correctional salaries, training, equipment, health care, legal
representation, real estate, insurance for high-risk
environments, utilities, and escapes. Direct costs build and
maintain a full-ride welfare state of 2.25 million prisoners
and the correctional personnel and property to manage
them. In fact, the direct costs encompass the largest group
of full-ride welfare recipients in the world. The average
prisoner costs the government about $30,000 annually in
direct costs. Direct costs may nominally be doubled to
account for indirect, collateral, and social costs.
"Prison costs are blowing holes in state budgets but
barely making a dent in recidivism rates."4 9 The total cost
exceeded $49 billion dollars in 2007, and in 2005 showed a
national per prisoner operating cost of $23,876.00 per
year.5 o The Vera Institute of Justice calculated that the
annual per prisoner cost to the American taxpayers in 2010
was $31,286.51. One study pegged the total annual costs at
more than $60 billion.52 That figure is still rising, taking
ever-larger shares of state general funds and crowding out
other priorities. 5 3 The State of California paid $49,000 per
prisoner per year according to its governor at mid-year
2009, who also said the national average was then already

49 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,

ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN

(2008),
3
2008,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sen
tencing-and corrections/onein_100.pdf.
o Id. at 11.
AMERICA

HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 44, at 10.
COMM'N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS,
at
available
1
(2006),
CONFINEMENT
CONFRONTING
52

http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Confrontin
gConfinement.pdf.
53 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 49, at 11-16.
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Incarceration costs
$32,000 per prisoner per year. 54
continually increase due to rising health care expenses for
older convicts. "[W]ith one in 100 adults looking out at
this country from behind an expensive wall of bars, the
potential for new approaches cannot be ignored."
Forward-thinking criminologists, recognizing the lack of
good answers in penology, actively seek new evidencebased techniques from other disciplines. 56 The nation may,
at long last, after taking on an additional 1,800,000 current
prisonerssince 1980," be hitting a bottom.
It is not just the prisons that are overcrowded and
expensive. Officers supervising parole and probation often
have more cases to handle than earlier thought optimal.
"At yearend 2011, there were about 4,814,200 adults under
community supervision." 59 Each of those probationers and
parolees costs thousands of dollars per year to supervise.
Direct expenditures on police and the judicial system
increased by several hundred percent over the last thirty
years.
Both Republicans and Democrats thought that the
nation had ended "welfare as we knew it" when work was
required of welfare recipients, but Americans forgot the

54 Arnold Schwarzenegger, Office of the Governor, Speech (June 12,

2009), www.gov.ca.gov. Jails are even more expensive than prisons on
a per prisoner basis.
5
56

THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 49, at 21.
MICHAEL

Dow

BURKHEAD,

THE

TREATMENT

OF

CRIMINAL

OFFENDERS: A HISTORY 173-75 (2007).
5 WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2006
(2007); JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND
JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000). The total incarcerated
population has declined slightly over the last two years.
58 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, AND
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 35 (2008).
59 LAURA MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012).
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biggest group of unemployed welfare recipients. 60 The
millions of what can be considered social parasites that the
nation fully supports in prisons and jails went almost
undetected during welfare reform. And their numbers have
increased markedly. Very few prisoners pay for more than
a tiny fraction of their upkeep, with most paying zero. In
addition to the "welfare costs" of supporting idle prisoners,
actual welfare payments outside prison increase when wage
earners leave families.
Incarceration
simultaneously
creates
more
unemployment because prisoners are vastly underemployed. Foreign workers regularly fill labor shortages
outside prison. Massive incarceration broadens widespread
unhappiness and societal disruption. The 2010 Census
arguably counted a couple of million prisoners "in the
The blockage of normal human
wrong place."
development and education are significant economic and
social costs.
Contrary to what judgments in criminal cases recite,
imprisonment "to hard labor" barely exists anymore. Most
prisoners are sidelined from strenuous, productive work
by
restrictive legislation. While the Thirteenth Amendment
means or implies that the state owns the value of the
prisoners' labor, 62 Congress and most states do not allow
60 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., PRISON LABOR:
(2002), available at
ROCKS
BREAKING
IT'S MORE THAN

www.dlc.org/documents/prison_1abor_502.pdf.
61 The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
as follows: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
62 See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Indeed,
the Thirteenth Amendment's specific exclusion of prisoner labor
supports the idea that a prisoner performing required work for the
prison is actually engaged in involuntary servitude, not employment.");
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themselves or private businesses to use the full value of that
labor, despite the benefits of jobs for prisoners and all
directly concerned interests. 63
Prison industries and labor achieve the pinnacle of
imperfect economic competition. With rare exceptions,
only the prison system can employ any of its inmates.
There is only a single seller of any goods produced, the
state. One type of buyer, a governmental entity, is the
purchaser, but the state does not necessarily have to buy its
goods from prison industries.64 Criminal and correctional
systems exclusively control entry into prison industries and
all eligibility for work therein. The transportation across
state lines and labeling of prison-made goods is restricted
or prohibited. Governments control the supply of and
demand for prison-made goods while holding all of their
manufacturing workers hostage. This creates a double or
triple monopoly over a system of punishment that has
always failed in its original purpose of rehabilitation.
These government monopolies-by no means simple
ones-create substantial economic inefficiencies, an
enormous deadweight loss. If the U.S. government and
states were subject to antitrust laws, their monopolies over
.prison industries would clearly violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act in multiple ways.
In the prison industry
Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[I]nmates

sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment
claim if the prison system requires them to work.").
63 Garvey, supra note 46, at 373.

6 18 U.S.C. § 4124 (2006).

U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
65

among the several States .

.

. is declared to be illegal."); 15 U.S.C.

§2

(2006) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . .

).
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context, the entire set of employment laws, including those
passed without prisoners in mind, is precisely the type of
social riidities associated with the long-term decline of
nations.
The American public would benefit if prisons
produced lower-cost goods. "In every country it always is
and must be the interest of the great body of the people to
buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest." 67
Instead of deriving economic benefit from prisoners,
federal law constructs impediments and uses their resources
"The Attorney General may make
without urgency.
available . .. the services of United States prisoners under

terms, conditions, and rates mutually agreed upon, for
constructing or repairing roads, clearing, maintaining and
reforesting public lands, building levees, and constructing
or repairing any other public ways or works .

...68

Due

to added security costs, low skill levels, and the importance
of heavy equipment, using prisoners to work outside prison
is the least efficient way to utilize their labor.
Prisoners, even if they work, enter a governmentcontrolled organization, monopoly, and welfare state. The
high unemployment and underemployment caused by
incarceration reduces tax revenues and greatly increases
government expenses. Economic disadvantages are greatly
exacerbated by the demographic changes wrought by
incarceration. Most of the 2.25 million prisoners in the
66

See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS-

ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982);

see also Zatz, supra note 5 (discussing a litany of prison labor
considerations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and other
Some prisoners today work in
employment-related statutes).
inconspicuous prison-located call centers, a commercial service
business not mentioned in the protectionist statutes.
67

SMITH, supra note 2, at 493.

68

18 U.S.C. § 4125 (2006).
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United States are able-bodied, and the majority of them
enter prison as young people. As the number of productive
workers shrinks in relation to retirees, the incarceration
regime locks up two million workers and keeps them
inactive most of the time. Workers that are not in prison
then have to support this dependent population. In a nation
of aging retirees, the subtraction from the labor force of this
many workers has a harmful economic effect as it skews
the labor force.
For decades, the economic effects of idle prisoners
remained modest compared to the growing American
population that supported those prisoners, the growing
economy, and the growing technological achievements.
During major wars, prisoners were more often released or
put to work. Harmful economic effects increased as the
American prison population multiplied, manufacturing jobs
fled overseas, and demographic trends reduced the
percentage of workers in the total population. Historically,
society has not subjected the criminal justice system to
cost-benefit analysis. 69
As a result of incarceration, commercial activity
declines, but government expenses, inside and outside of
prison, increase. The private sector spending continues to
lose ground to public sector spending, with all the
inefficiencies that public spending entails. Payment of
child support, for example, declines as a result of
incarceration. Therefore, public assistance to the families
of those dependent prisoners increases. Transportation
expenses to and from prison visitation increase. Homeless
people commit crimes for the support advantages of
incarceration. And even some homeless people try to
commit federal crimes to enjoy the better conditions in
federal prisons.
69 Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in CriminalLaw, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 323, 338-39 (2004).
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Numerous monopolies inhibit prisons, including
monopolies over prison industries, labor, labeling, and the
transportation of prison-made goods, along with a failed
monopoly over the process of rehabilitation. Instead of
rehabilitating and producing goods or services, prison
systems are an expensive way to make bad people worse.
The only demonstrable economic benefit derived from
incarceration is that the incapacitation of 2.25 million
prisoners who cannot commit crimes outside the prisons
and jails while incarcerated prevents injuries to others.
However, crimes continue behind bars.
Government controls eligibility for work, hiring,
firing, and all of the wages, terms, and conditions of
employment. Security costs and risks, plus the low skill
and literacy levels of prisoners, make prevailing wage
In addition,
requirements difficult to overcome.
governments own and operate most prison industries and
decide which private companies can operate a business or
industry in prison or with prison labor. All purchases,
sales, and transportation of raw materials and prison-made
goods are made by or tightly controlled through the
government.
Federal and state laws concerning prison labor are
the strongest racially and gender-based discriminatory
employment barriers in the country today, adversely
impacting African-Americans and men. Each state is free
to restrict the sale of prison-made items, and many do.
Various private sector efforts showed promise in the later
twentieth century, but none of them ever worked for more
70
than a relative handful of prisoners.
Prisoners are not accurately reflected in
unemployment statistics because the Bureau of Labor

70 SUTHERLAND, supra note 14, at 305-07.
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Statistics only counts non-institutionalized people. 7 ' To be
accurate, unemployment statistics should count about 90%
of prison inmates as unemployed rather than subtracting
them from the workforce. If the unemployment rate was so
calculated, then the official unemployment rate would go
up approximately one half of 1%.
While the United States harms its own economy
with massive incarceration, Chinese prison-made goods
enter the United States against federal law72 with impunity,
Today, China incarcerates an
often as components.
estimated three to five million dissidents, slackers, and
criminals in a vast network of reform-through-labor or
Laogai camps. 73 Despite international agreements and U.S.
statutes, products made by unpaid forced labor find their
way to the United States, and they are not labeled as prisonmade goods as called for under 18 U.S.C. § 1762. Product
components made in Laogai camps pass undetected. Many
internet sales that are conducted in English link to the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 74 According to the Laogai
Research Foundation, prisons produce large profits for the
Chinese government.
Prisons are
"Making Bad People Worse."
populated
societies
predatory
typically thought to house
with profoundly selfish people. Stress and fear of assault
n Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S.
5,
2013),
(Apr.
STAT.
LAB.
BUREAU
LAB.
DEP'T
http://www.bls.gov/cps/1fcharacteristics.htm#laborforce ("The labor
force is the sum of employed and unemployed persons. The labor force
participation rate is the labor force as a percent of the civilian
noninstitutional population.").
72 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2006).
73 See LAOGAI MUSEUM, www.laogaimuseum.org (last visited Oct. 8,
2013).
74 LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUND., NOT FOR SALE: ADVERTISING FORCED

LABOR

PRODUCTS

FOR

ILLEGAL

EXPORT

10-11

(2010),

laogai.org/sites/default/files/pdf/lrfenterprise-ads-report.pdf.
7 Id. at 16-17.
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are common. Prisoners often feel threatened by their own
cellmates. The best current method of controlling assaults
in prison is to prosecute offenders, thereby lengthening
their sentences. Mentally ill prisoners forget to take their
medications; require complicated cell extractions using
protective gear, force, and pepper spray; and end up in
segregation.
Prisons daily affront human dignity. Prisoners
suffer from violence, fear of violence, self-mutilation, gang
influence, and racism. Many prison inmates suffer rape,
sexual and physical assaults, or death while incarcerated.
Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act in 2003,
which set up a Prison Rape Elimination Commission.
Prisoners who complain about sexual assaults risk
retaliation by their rapists or other prisoners and are then at
much greater risk of future assaults for being known as
both "punks" (rape victims) and "snitches" (informants). 76
Rape victims can contract sexually transmitted diseases.
On July 31, 2008, the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission said, regarding juvenile correctional facilities,
"It is particularly striking that fully 43 percent of those
incidents were reported to involve misconduct or
harassment by correctional staff-the very people who are
responsible for protecting these most vulnerable inmates."
Prisons readily breed infections, and diseases
multiply in prison. The Commission on Safety and Abuse
in America's Prisons found
[h]igh rates of disease and
among prisoners,
illness
with inadequate
coupled
for correctional
funding
76

HUMAN

LITIGATION

RIGHTS
REFORM

WATCH,

No EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON
ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2009),

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us06O9webwcover.pdf.
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health
care,
endanger
prisoners, staff and the
public. Much of the public
dismisses jails and prisons as
sealed institutions, where
what happens inside remains
inside. In the context of
disease and illness, which
travel naturally from one
environment to another, that
view is clearly wrong.
The suicide rate for American prisoners is five to 15
times greater than it is for the general American
population. 7 Possessions are removed, family excluded,
and sexual desire frustrated. Gender segregation prohibits
normal sex. Sexual deviancy increases. Life is unpleasant.
Sanity depends upon mental toughness. Worries remain.
Most prisoners are unhappy. Many are unhappy all of the
time. Pagan, satanic, racist, and occult religious texts are
more popular in prison than outside. Fewer programs for
inmates exist than in prior years. Most prison cells are not
air-conditioned, which can be a medical problem,
especially in warmer climates. 7 8
The nation takes every prisoner away from his or
her spouse, family, and friends. The free world isolates and
abandons prisoners with long sentences. Many prisoners
do not receive any visits from friends or family.79 Solid
24 (1992).
78 Climate helps explain in part why (1) prisons began and were more
common in the North, (2) northern states today have the highest
incarceration rates of African-Americans, indicating hot Southern
prisons might be a crime deterrent in the age of air-conditioning, and
(3) Arabians disfavor incarceration over other punishments.
1 ALISON LIEBLING, SUICIDES IN PRISON

79 GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 65 (1958).
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barriers separate the prisoner and visitors during visits.
Gangs successfully recruit members in prison, spreading
their anti-social ideas and breeding virulent bigotry. By
being in prison, prisoners take on the penitentiary's sick
underclass values, codes, and dogma. The longer the
prison sentence, the more the values and codes affect the
prisoner. The closed environment of prison is kept from
view because prisons severely restrict the media's access,
routinely prohibit press interviews, and monitor and censor
mail and telephone communications.80 Dreadful things
often do not receive investigation or publicity. Through the
centuries, lack of communication between prison and the
outside world allowed abuses to go undetected inside the
closed prison environment. Prisons harm people in several
ways but do not make enough of them penitent.
Incarceration teaches depravity, affects minds adversely,
and then releases prisoners into the free world on their
mandatory release dates or on parole. Criminals learn
better how to commit crimes but not how to be productive
in the free world.
In the last twenty years, the use of segregation or
solitary confinement has increased markedly, worsening
outcomes and significantly increasing expenses for the
prison system. Solitary confinement-known as isolation,
punitive segregation, disciplinary segregation, segregated
housing, and other names-causes psychiatric harm in
manifold ways, especially to those with previous mental
illnesses. Solitary confinement can cause psychotic
disorganization, self-destructive behavior, delusions, panic
attacks, paranoia, and an inability to adapt to the general
Hypersensitivity, rage, aggression,
prison population.
memory problems, concentration problems, and impulsecontrol problems can also stem from segregated housing
units. Intolerance of social interaction is one of the more
80

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76, at 44-45.
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common results. With respect to the ill effects of solitary
confinement, Harvard psychiatrist Stuart Grassian said,
"The laws and practices that have established and
perpetuated this tragedy deeply offend any sense of
common human decency." 8 ' Prisoners requiring solitary
confinement are more frequently those who cannot obey
prison rules but are not usually the worst offenders in terms
of criminal convictions. Solitary confinement is on the rise
for disciplinary and security reasons and creates additional
expenses.
Prisons are therefore on a different planet compared
to employment-related legislation regulating free labor.
Those advocating employment rights for prisoners ought to
consider the employer's potential regulatory and legal
compliance costs. How many manufacturers would place
their operations in a prison, employ problematic prison
labor at prevailing wages, and then face numerous frivolous
lawsuits? There is no general federal or state right to airconditioning in the free world, but Southern prisoners
would naturally love air-conditioning. Prisoners live in
"sweatshops" as it is. There is no law for or against
boredom either, but boredom naturally makes prisoners
want real jobs. Federal and state legislation creates
approximately a 90% unemployment rate, exclusive of
prison housework, while bored prisoners stay overheated in
the summer. Reforming incarceration requires an entirely
new way of conducting business.
Prisons are revolving doors for
Recidivism.
recidivists. The number released is about equal to the
number imprisoned. Every year, a large and poorly
disciplined American army of released prisoners-about
700,000 ex-cons-goes back to the streets. Released
convicts face many re-entry obstacles, most do not make
81

Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22

WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 355 (2006).
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the transition successfully, and huge numbers are returned
to the prison system. Prisons are, as Jens Soering's 2004
book title reveals, An Expensive Way to Make Bad People
Worse.82 In 2007, 725,000 prisoners were released from
jail or prison. Their suicide risk is very high in the first few
weeks and months after release. Carrying the "felon" or
"ex-con" stigma, prisoners often leave without much job
training, substance abuse counseling, or education.
Released prisoners replicate the trauma of slave
emancipation every day: they have trouble finding homes,
work, and food. A huge percentage of convicted felons are
unemployed when arrested and when released are often
unemployed again, immediately and several years after
release. Finding and keeping employment is one of the
biggest barriers to re-entry.
Offenders usually lack job skills and work habits,
and when they are released, they encounter a shrinking
number of low-skill jobs. Offenders cannot easily comply
with the terms of their probation or parole unless they hold
a job. Many prisoners are illiterate or only semi-literate.
One good thing that prisons often do is educate prisoners to
the GED level, but the public opposes paying for college
degrees. Some prisoners, especially young ones, have
never held regular jobs. Collateral sanctions bar convicted
felons from employment, positions, welfare, housing,
student loans, food stamps, voting rights, the right to keep
and bear arms, jury service, and other benefits. Their postrelease status injects them into a New Jim Crow regime,

82 JENS SOERING, AN EXPENSIVE WAY TO MAKE BAD PEOPLE WORSE:
AN ESSAY ON PRISON REFORM FROM AN INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE

(2004).

83 LIOR GIDEON, SUBSTANCE ABUSING

INMATES: EXPERIENCES OF

RECOVERING DRUG ADDICTS ON THEIR WAY BACK HOME

68 (2010).
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where they are second-class citizens by operation of law. 84
As Emma Goldman wrote years ago,
Year after year the gates of
prison hells return to the
world
an
emaciated,
deformed,
will-less,
crew
of
shipwrecked
humanity, with the Cain mark
on their foreheads, their
hopes crushed, all their
natural inclinations thwarted.
With nothing but hunger and
inhumanity to greet them,
these victims soon sink back
into crime as the only
possibility of existence.8 5
Danger increases even more when convicts
go from solitary confinement directly to the streets.
Certain categories of released prisoners have a
problem staying out of trouble in the first three years of
their new freedom; many do not make it six months.
Released inmates typically end up back in trouble, jail, or
prison, having been unable to cope in the free world. Every
year, approximately 300,000 parolees return to prison due
to parole violations alone, usually because they committed
In addition, the United States incarcerates
new crimes.
many thousands of probationers every year for violating the
84

See

MICHELLE

ALEXANDER,

THE

NEW

JIM

CROW:

MASS

INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
8 Emma Goldman, Prisons, in THE CRY FOR JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF THE LITERATURE OF SOCIAL PROTEST 147-48 (Upton Sinclair ed.,

1915).

86

NAT'LRESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 10.
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terms of their probations, for new offenses, or for other
reasons. Substantial recidivism keeps America's jails and
prisons full.
Returning parolees increase crime rates in their
Offenders on probation or parole commit
neighborhoods.
a prodigious number of crimes, enough to turn the public
against these "alternative sentences." A study by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of
Justice found that in the year 1991, 162,000 probation
violators were sent to prison and those violators-with
almost half using illegal drugs daily-had committed 6,400
murders, 7,400 rapes, 10,400 aggravated assaults, and
17,000 robberies. 8 9 With statistics like these, states and the
federal government eliminated or tightened the
requirements for parole and "good time." Over half the
states enacted truth-in-sentencing laws, which require
completion of most of the original sentence. The very best
modern treatment programs, cognitive behavioral therapies,
have a small but statistically significant impact on
recidivism rates, but these therapies cost money and are not
commonly used. 90
Civil rights activists decry the New Age slavery of
prison followed by a New Jim Crow regime that has
87LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROBATION AND PAROLE INTHE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2007).

88John R. Hipp & Daniel K. Yates, Do Returning Parolees Affect

Neighborhood Crime? A Case Study of Sacramento, 47 CRIMINOLOGY
619 (2009).
89 ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE

VIOLATORS INSTATE PRISON, 1991 (1995).
90 BURKHEAD, supra note 56, at 165-73; Mark W. Lipsey et al., Effects
of Cognitive-BehavioralProgramsfor Criminal Offenders, CAMPBELL
2007),
9,
(Aug.
COLLABORATION

www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/143/; Paul Gendreau &
D.A. Andrews, Tertiary Prevention: What the Meta-Analyses of the
Offender Treatment Literature Tell Us About "What Works," 32
CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 173, 173-84 (1990).
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created a new pariah class in our supposedly color-blind
society. 9 1
While work is considered critical to
rehabilitation and re-entry into society, most employers
refuse to hire convicted felons or former prisoners. This
dilemma forces many released prisoners back into a life of
crime, continuing the cycle of recidivism. As a result,
correctional populations are huge. "Adult correctional
authorities supervised about 6,977,700 offenders at yearend
2011 . . . which includes probationers, parolees, local jail
inmates, and prisoners in the custody of state and federal
facilities." 9 2
A large Bureau of Prisons study, Post-Release
Employment Project (PREP), found job training programs
in prison substantially reduce recidivism. 93 Another study
indicates job training in prison may benefit minorities more
than other prisoners. 94 Other studies found little significant
effect, 95 but no studies find that prison labor and job
training increase recidivism. Hard work in a position more
closely approximating a real job in the competitive private
sector, allowing prisoners to accumulate savings,
91 ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003) (using the term
"New Age Slavery" for the first time); ALEXANDER, supra note 84
(coining and explaining "New Jim Crow Regime").
92 GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 3.
93 William G. Saylor & Gerald G. Gaes, Training Inmates Through

Industrial Work Participation and Vocational and Apprenticeship
Instruction, I CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 32 (1997).
94 See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR & GERALD G. GAES, THE DIFFERENTIAL
EFFECT OF INDUSTRIES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING ON POST RELEASE
OUTCOME FOR ETHNIC AND RACIAL GROUPS (1999), available at

http://www.bop.gov/news/research-projects/published-reports/recidivi
sm/oreprprep.sl.pdf.
9 See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR & GERALD G. GAES, COMMENTARY ABOUT
THE SCIENTIFIC MERIT OF THE POST RELEASE EMPLOYMENT PROJECT

(PREP)

(2002),

available

at

http://www.bop.gov/news/research-projects/published-reports/edutrai
ning/ saylor-gaes-commentary.pdf.
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conditioning prisoners to a long work week, and enforcing
pro-social work environments under powerful management
is bound to reduce recidivism more than existing
government vocational training programs not focused on
profitability. A prisoner conditioned to work sixty hours
per week will easily work forty hours per week in the free
world.
Social Consequences of Massive Incarceration.
Given the social consequences of massive incarceration, the
questions become whether the United States deserves the
developments brought on by massive incarceration and
whether the country can benefit by putting its prison
Macroeconomic
population to profitable work.
disadvantages, the expansion of big government, public
debt, a huge increase in the welfare state, social costs, and
the decline in personal liberty all prove that enormous
incarceration is harmful to the nation as a whole.
The economic and social inefficiencies and
disadvantages of incarceration are surpassed only by the
From the
ineffectiveness of the punishment itself.
perspective of a behaviorist, prison is a poor form of
learning because the punishment is delayed too long from
the commission of the criminal behavior sought to be
controlled. Further, the behavior most often taught in
prison is to follow prison rules, not behavior for success on
the outside.
Massive incarcerationis a social disaster. Indirect
and human costs of incarceration probably equal direct
expenditures. Child support payments virtually stop once a
prison sentence starts. Collateral social costs include
increased welfare payments and social services for the
children and families of the incarcerated. Increased suicide
and mental illness among prisoners and the stunted
development of human capital affect most prisoners. The
majority of prisoners do not perform much useful labor,
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and their earnings, job skills, education, and
entrepreneurship opportunities suffer or disappear. The
destruction of families and the imbalance in sex ratios
in African-American
particularly
outside prison,
communities, have long-term harmful social effects.
Families of incarcerated persons frequently have to drive
long distances for visitation. Overrepresentation of African
-Americans in this new pariah class also increases the racial
divide on economic, social, and educational dimensions.
Lowered rates of fertility result. Incarceration breaks up
families, marriages, and communities. The children of the
incarcerated grow up without parents and are then more
prone to criminal activity themselves. Marriage prospects
decline, resulting in less opportunity for stable home
environments that would otherwise decrease crime.
Correctional expenses crowd education funding out of state
and local budgets. 96 Barriers to geographic mobility are
erected, not just for prisoners but for their families.
"Nothing Works:" The Failure of Government
Regulation. The Effectiveness of CorrectionalTreatment:
A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies evaluated 231
different studies and found very little in the way of prisoner
rehabilitation that had any positive impact on recidivism. 97
A simplistic summary of this survey arose: "Nothing
works." This sound bite sprung up based on a 1974 article
by one of the co-authors of The Effectiveness of
Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation

96

See NAACP, MISPLACED PRIORITIES: OVER INCARCERATE, UNDER

EDUCATE-EXCESSIVE SPENDING ON INCARCERATION UNDERMINES
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN COMMUNITIES (2d

at
available
2011),
ed.
http://naacp.3cdn.net/ecea56adeef3d84a28_azsm639wz.pdf.
97
See DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975).
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Studies.9 8 A decade later, Congress "recognized that the
efforts of the criminal justice system to achieve
rehabilitation of offenders had failed." 99 The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole in the federal system,
sought to eliminate huge sentencing disparities, basically
madel all federal sentences determinate, said "punishment
should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and
incapacitative goals," and found that "imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."' 0 0 From 34,263 federal prisoners in 1984,
the federal prison population grew to 214,774 in 2011, over
a six-fold increase, ' and this does not count growth in
state prison systems and jails in all fifty states.
and state legislatures effectively
Congress
sabotaged rehabilitation in prison by eliminating the
indeterminate sentence, destroying the market for prisonmade goods and labor, and passing other ill-considered
At the same time, Congress and state
legislation.
legislatures established state monopolies over prison
Prisons became enormously
industries and labor.
expensive after the prison population proliferated.
American incarceration represents in multiple dimensions
the utter failure of over-regulation; it achieves the opposite
of the intended goal. A system originally designed for
rehabilitation actually makes prisoners worse over time. A
losing War on Drugs creates casualties but returns POWs to
the streets. Sentences to "hard labor" became sentences to
forced inactivity. Prison gangs gained power. Sentences
were lengthened through various means, though this had
98

IAIN

MURRAY,

EXPERIENCE

OF

MAKING

REHABILITATION WORK: AMERICAN
available at
PRISONERS,

REHABILITATING

http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/Rehab.pdf.
99 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
1n Id. at 367; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).
101
United States v. Diaz, No. 1-CR-00821-2, 2013 WL 322243, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (citing DOJ statistics).
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little effect on deterrence.
Additional conduct was
criminalized. Paradoxically, most of the law and order
voices who favored tougher stances on crime, including the
author, were also proponents of private enterprise and
smaller government, yet the result ultimately achieved in
corrections exponentially increased the size, power,
intrusiveness, and expense of government.
In 2010,
Michelle Alexander expressed great exasperation with the
failure of civil rights legislation and advocacy to prevent
creation of "The New Jim Crow" in an age of supposed
color-blindness. There is plenty of blame to go around in
every direction of the political spectrum. The invention of
the penitentiary and subsequent growth of incarceration
prove the power of unintended consequences. Societies do
not legislatively abolish all barbaric human traits because
those characteristics always seem to return later in
different, concealed, or unexpected places. They operate in
a veneer of civilization and only within the tolerances
permitted by human nature. Peace treaties can lead to war.
Laws intended for good sometimes cause violence and
disorder. It is thought that society sees the worst of human
nature in criminals, who obviously require extraordinary
handling.
The nation's rejection of rehabilitation was made
without reference to the corrective power of thriving prison
industries, which teach work skills and discipline. Studies
show the ineffectiveness of standard prison sentences
compared to the value of work and some alternative
sentencing arrangements.102 History proves prisons can be
profitable. Private prison employment would likely be
even more reformative, especially if employers controlled

Kevin Marsh & Chris Fox, The Benefit and Cost of Prison in the
U.K.: The Results of a Model of Lifetime Re-Offending, 4 J.
102

EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 403, 403-23 (2008).
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the entire prison environment as well as the work itself.
Work and crime are opposites.
Incapacitation: The Value of Incarceration. The
goal that prisons should be self-supporting has been
forgotten. The four remaining purposes of prisons are
usually said to be (1) punishment or retribution, (2)
deterrence, (3) incapacitation or public protection while
offenders are incarcerated, and (4) rehabilitation. Scientific
research on criminal deterrence fails to find much deterrent
value in incarceration.103 Indefinite prison sentences in the
future, to be served in places they may never have seen, are
not foremost in criminals' minds when offending. With
regard to imprisonment, "there is not a strong relationship
between objective sanctions and perceived sanctions."
The "dirty little secrets" in crime deterrence research prove
that the threat of confinement deters crime very little
compared to the massive investment in this punishment;
incarceration is simply not certain, severe, or swift. 0 5
Even though prisons fail in their goals of deterrence
and rehabilitation, there is one way they succeed:
incapacitation. When criminals are in prison, they cannot
commit crimes in the free world. Studies show great value
in temporarily preventing crime with incapacitation.
Incapacitation now ranks as the primary justification for
prison. A reputable study found that for each convict
released due to prison overcrowding litigation, fifteen
crimes are committed, at a cost of $45,000 above the
average cost of keeping a prisoner for one year.106 Dr.
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818
(2010).
103

1"

Id. at 808.

15 See id.

106See Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison PopulationSize on Crime
Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111-2 Q. J.
ECON. 319, 319-51 (1996).
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Levitt found four reasons for the marked decrease in U.S.
crime, starting in about 1991: the rising prison population,
more police, the receding crack cocaine epidemic, and the
The National Institute of Justice
legalization of abortion.
published a widely cited 1987 statistical study by Dr.
Edwin W. Zedlewski entitled Making Confinement
Decisions. Making Confinement Decisions found that it
costs more to release offenders than to keep them confined;
the study computed annual costs of $430,000 per prisoner
released. 0 8 Dr. Zedlewski's findings utilized a Rand
Corporation survey of inmates, which found the average
inmate was committing 187 to 287 crimes per year before
incarceration.109
One advantage of prison is that it gives young men
and women time to mature. After lengthy prison sentences,
older, more mature offenders are less likely to re-offend
violently than when they were younger. Some sober up in
prison. The incapacitation effect literally keeps crimes
from occurring. The early release of prisoners, brought on
by budgetary and financial difficulties, causes crime to
increase, especially in the large urban areas to which
criminals usually return. While logic and data will instruct
authorities as to the least threatening prisoners to release,
given current recidivism rates, the early release of multiple
prisoners inevitably causes an increase in crime. While
incarceration itself is harmful and may increase the
propensity of a criminal to recidivate, that increased
likelihood is smaller than the decrease in crime brought
about by the complete incapacitation of offenders while
Steven Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990's:
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18-1 J.
107 See

ECON. PERSP. 163, 163-90 (2004).
'08 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF

IMPRISONMENT 93 (Univ. Chi. Press 1991).
'09 Id.
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incarcerated. Modern prisons do not rehabilitate or deter
crime very well, but prisoners naturally do not deserve to
be in the free world, where they would commit many more
crimes than they do in prison. The revitalization of prison
industries, including putting prisoners to work, is a prime
way to reconcile the value of incapacitation with reductions
in recidivism brought about by the aging or maturation
process. Those serving life without parole and other long
sentences make some of the best workers.
Past Calls for Freeing Prison Labor. Scholars
and some leaders agree about the need to overthrow the
protectionist regime. In 1985, professors J. Roger Lee and
Laurin A. Wollan, Jr. proposed a "libertarian prison" in
which prisoners were free to produce, run businesses, and
move inside the walls of prison, subject of course to
surveillance and normal legal restraints.' 10 The National
Center for Policy Analysis in 1996 released Factories
Behind Bars by economist Morgan 0. Reynolds,
advocating greater private sector involvement."' In 1998,
law professor Stephen P. Garvey called for Freeing
Prisoners'Laborin a Stanford Law Review article with that
title.112 Professor Garvey outlined the strangulation of
prison industries over the years and proposed opening the
market for prison goods and labor, removing the
"embargo." U.S. Representative Bill McCollum of Florida
introduced the Free Market Prison Industries Reform Act of
1998 and conducted hearings before that bill died in House

110See J. Roger Lee & Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., The LibertarianPrison:
Principlesof Laissez-Faire Incarceration,65-2 PRISON J. 108, 108-21
(1985).
"I MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, NCPA
POLICY REPORT No. 206: FACTORIES BEHIND BARS (1996), availableat
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st206.pdf.
112See Garvey, supra note
46.
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committee. 1 3
In 1999, economist Steven D. Levitt
contended that inmate labor participation should increase
by removing existing legal barriers.'1 4 After all these
writings and hearings, prison and jail populations rose
sharply.
Difficulty of Change. Prisoners are the least
popular segment of modem society considering that society
keeps them hidden and concern for them is very low.
Many Americans want prison to be worse than it is, and
there is a prevailing myth that prisoners have it easy.
Politicians lose elections if they appear "soft on crime." It
is possible to see prison as a failed social experiment of the
last 200 years, but society now accepts it as the norm and is
Correctional officials
appalled at some alternatives.
working in the civil service are not in a good position to
strongly advocate major structural changes. Jails, where
prisoners serve shorter sentences and extra space is not
often available, are admittedly not typically suitable for
industrial operations, but jail prisoners are more easily
transported with less risk.

113PrisonIndustry Reform

Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4100 and H.R.
2758 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
at
available
(1998),
Cong.
105th
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57231.000/hju572
31_Of.htm. Dr. Morgan 0. Reynolds testified as follows: "Our current
policy is the height of folly. To ban any part of the population from
productive employment opportunities creates a string of economic
losers. A new study of inmate labor from the American Bar
Association's subcommittee on correctional industries shows that the
unemployment problem in prisons is getting worse rather than better.
The nation's inmate population is growing so rapidly that the share of
state and federal prisoners with jobs has shrunk from 7.6% to 6.5%
since 1990." Id.
114 See Steven D. Levitt, The Economics of Inmate Labor Participation
available at
manuscript),
1999) (unpublished
(May 26,
http://caselaw.org/Files/Levitt%20Paper.doc.
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Many who identify with the plight of prisoners
stand in the way of revitalizing prison industries by
complaining about the "exploitation" of prison labor or by
insisting on rights and wages enjoyed in the free world.
These anti-business advocates, known by their use of the
term "prison-industrial complex," do not fully realize that
prisoners want to perform useful labor; such employment is
good for everyone; prisoners first exploited society to earn
their incarceration; big government and a massive legal
structure has failed prisoners; private enterprise is the
wellspring of economic progress; or the prison workforce
necessarily contains many problematic workers. The hard
truth is that it is better to be exploited than ignored or
marginalized. At the height of exploitation, antebellum
slaves were, on average, valued," 5 happier, treated better,
and were exponentially more productivell 6 than "New Age
slaves" in prison. 7
According to scholars, penal systems in stable
The principle of less
nations change very slowly.
eligibility means that the public wants prison life to be
1" A top field hand in today's money was worth up to $45,000.
116ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS:

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (Univ. Press of Am.

1974), established that antebellum slavery was efficient and as
profitable as industrial investments in the North. They found that
slaves consumed 88% of their own economic production. Id. at 153.
This work was and continues to be an eye-opener.
117 See JOHN DEWAR GLEISSNER, PRISON & SLAVERY: A SURPRISING

COMPARISON (Outskirts Press, Inc. 2010). Except for educational
opportunities, slaves lived better day-to-day and were far happier than
modern prisoners; food, clothing, and immediate shelter were
comparable; slaves enjoyed their families, co-workers, spouses, friends,
festivities, churches, had greater freedom of movement, better health,
community peace, worked with animals, pastoral environment, less
sexual exploitation, etc.
"

JOHAN THORSTEN SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 132

(Elsevier Scientific Publ'g Co. 1976).
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worse than the lifestyle enjoyed by the poorest law-abiding
citizens. Because modern punishment is hidden, the public
remains ignorant and apathetic in many ways. In other
words, modern prison life is "out of sight, out of mind."
The public presumably likes to see prisoners picking up
trash on the side of the road, but this masks widespread
idleness inside jails and prisons. The public presumably
does not care much, if at all, whether the lives of prisoners
The interplay between state and federal
improve.
governments compounded the difficulty of remedying the
protectionist regime. When the federal government gave
the states power to ban the sale of prison-made goods, at a
time when most states sought to do just that, the anti-free
trade and pro-government monopolies took root and grew
in their insidious yet anemic ways. The monopolistic
regime was never wiped away, even though the SmootHawley Tariff and similar laws were repealed in favor of
international trade.
Prison labor law is now inextricably bound up with
other restrictive or expensive legislation and tort law. This
and the
includes mandatory source preferences
complications of federal and state procurement laws,
international, interstate and intra-state transportation and
sales barriers, labeling, required employee benefits, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Title VII, Prison Litigation Reform
Act, and the Inmate Accident Compensation Act. Change
in this area must also address the concerns of the public,
political constituencies, and affected businesses and labor.
Bureaucracies resist change.
The greatest drivers of prison reform today will be
budgetary, economic, and financial problems, some of
which bring on judicial denunciations and prisoner releases.
Because elected officials presumably do not favor
prisoners, unelected officials, namely federal judges, act
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when conditions violate the Constitution, a debatable yet
necessary standard.
In Brown v. Plata,'l9 the U.S. Supreme Court called
California's severely overcrowded correctional system,
exacerbated by "an unprecedented budgetary shortfall,"
unconscionable, unsafe, harsh, toxic, criminogenic, violent,
unsanitary, chaotic, disease-ridden, violent, and suicideinducing, all resulting in torture, lingering deaths, and a
culture of cynicism, fear, and despair.' o The federal courts
over several years forced California to drastically lower its
prison population. From December 31, 2010, to December
31, 2011, California's prison population decreased by
15,493, more than the U.S. prison population as a whole.121
Thus, forced prisoner releases in California fully and
statistically explain the entire 2011 decline in the U.S.
prison population, which is not a clear sign of progress,
especially if, as predicted by some, it causes an increase in
crime.
Legal and Structural Changes Needed. State-run
correctional industries do not have one clearly defined goal;
several missions are in their mission statements. Is their
primary goal to help the prisoner train for work after prison
and reduce recidivism, or do they intend to save the state
money? Are they supposed to create peaceful prison
conditions or provide goods to other divisions of
government? Do they produce the highest quality at the
lowest price? If they are really helping the taxpayer, why
do they often lose money?
Most prisoners do not work, prison industries
cannot usually sell goods in the private sector, and
11

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011).

I20
id.

121E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
available at
(2012),
tbl.2
3
2011,
IN
PRISONERS
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl1 .pdf.
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prisoners generally do very little to offset the enormous
costs of their own incarcerations. When prison systems
made profits, they worked prisoners very hard under the
Auburn System in the private industrial setting. Industrial
work avoids the extra security costs and inefficiencies of
roadwork and other tasks prisoners are allowed to do today
but which chores are not nearly as productive as organized
manufacturing work in secure facilities.
Changes in the legal and economic structures of
prisons can be made without reducing the benefits of
incapacitation. The primary vehicle for revitalizing prison
industries and benefiting the American economy will be
private prison industries operating in secure prison
environments free of wage and hour laws and almost all
employment-related legislation and tort claims, thereby
imposing greater discipline on prisoners. The nation must
get government-owned-and-operated prison industries out
of the business of losing money and force them to transition
to a market economy. Far from being exploitation of
prison labor, prisoners would naturally welcome the paying
jobs. Putting hundreds of thousands of people to work
would help revitalize the American economy and bring
To
manufacturing jobs back to the United States.
overcome the previously unfair competition presented by
unpaid or poorly paid prison labor, prison industries might
be restricted to making goods now made exclusively
overseas.122 In this way, all Americans would benefit, even
those in organized labor.
122Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (UNICOR) is trying to jump on this
bandwagon by taking advantage of a program designed for private
businesses ("During fiscal year 2012, FPI received legislative authority
to participate in the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP) and to manufacture products that would otherwise be
produced outside of the United States, as approved by FPI's Board of
Directors. With the passage of these authorities, FPI's Board has
approved 14 pilot programs for repatriated products. FPI anticipates
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According to free market economists, prohibiting
mutually beneficial exchanges harms the economy.
Protective legislation at the federal and state levels greatly
limits prison industries and labor. The modern prison
regime suffers because it cannot participate freely in an
open market. Prison-made goods are about the only legal
products in the whole country not allowed to be sold freely
in the market. Stifling economic production in prison
drained the economy more as prison populations rose. It is
time to repeal those protectionist statutes, the last relics of
the Smoot-Hawley legislative era, to create a more open
market for prison-made goods.
Society remembers labor exploitation by private
enterprise during the Industrial Revolution, slavery, and
serfdom, but none of those labor regimes were as bad as the
current incarceration regime. The current prison regime
oppresses the punishers along with the punished and helps
foreign manufacturers. Private enterprise would create a
better working environment without coercion. Prisoners
would have to live and work without any sense of
entitlement. The more exacting requirements of private
employers under a competitive employment-at-will regime
would impose upon inmates the discipline that has ever
been associated with rehabilitation.
CREATING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING JOBs-8 STEPS

1. Repeal Restrictive Federal and State Trade
Statutes. The federal government made a fundamental
mistake when it allowed interstate commerce to be
regulated in fifty-one different places, and that mistake can
best be corrected by federal preemption now. Federal and
these pilot projects will assist in further reducing its losses."). OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 4, at 2.

This action merely

compounds bureaucratic impediments in an attempt to stop red ink.

44

Fall 2013 1Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 210
state statutes prohibiting and limiting the manufacture,
purchase, sale, and shipment of prisoner-made goods
should be repealed or preempted. Prisoner-made goods
should be allowed to move in interstate commerce to the
same extent as any other product, without special labeling
requirements. Mandatory source requirements could be
eliminated on a government-by-government basis as staterun correctional industries competed with private
businesses. Existing prison industries for the sake of
efficiency would adapt to the market without existing
preferences. Government agencies would be freed from
purchasing restrictions.
Existing state protective trade legislation was
passed to prevent the evils of convict leasing, prevent
unfair competition, and preserve government control over
prison labor and industries. To some extent, the states were
retaliating with trade barriers in response to the barriers set
up against them by other states. Any statute that protected
the worker or public from harm should not be affected in
any reformed system.
2. Limited Freedom of Contract. Freedom of
contract should prevail between prison employers,
prisoners, and federal and state correctional institutions.
Prisoners and private businesses (or existing correctional
industries) would negotiate on a laissez-faire basis, within
the limitations imposed by ongoing sentences of
Federal and state governments should
imprisonment.
encourage contracts between private and state businesses
and prisoners regarding negotiated wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Private prison industries could
be established within space rented from the prison or in
separate secure facilities, forcing out state-sponsored
businesses if it benefited the state. Transportation, food,
clothing, and shelter might all be addressed in contracts if
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industries chose to employ workers outside existing prison
walls.
Instead of the prison system or state leasing its
prisoners, as in the discredited convict leasing systems of
the past, prisoners should contract directly with private
employers. Involuntary convict leasing has a tragic record
and should be avoided. The history of convict leasing
provides guidance on how not to work prison labor: do not
intermingle the determination of guilt with the desire for
cheap labor; do not let the government lease convicts; do
not eliminate wages or incentives for decent treatment; do
not make most prison labor involuntary; do not send
prisoners to the most dangerous jobs; and of course do not
discriminate on the basis of race.
In practice, a tri-partite contractual relationship
would arise because prisons would impose conditions on
private employers and prisoner-employees. The primary
condition would be that prisoners remain in prison or be
securely confined in a comparable facility. While this may
sound complicated, it would take on many attributes of
existing tri-partite, dual-employer contracts between
general employers (temporary service employers or
agencies), special employers (companies needing work
performed), and their shared employees. Although we need
to get government-owned-and-operated prison industries
out of their current business of losing money, the state will
Private
remain involved in a lesser but vital role.
enterprises could submit bids to prisons regarding the
renting of developed or undeveloped space, machinery,
utilities, and other industrial needs. These concessions
would reduce the costs of incarceration. State correctional
industries could sell out to private concerns, partner with
other businesses, transform themselves, or try to survive as
they are.
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Obviously, businesses will create contracts to
ensure productivity, peaceful work environments,
innovation, and hard work. Contracting parties can achieve
these goals by agreement much better than any level of
government regulation. Employers would surely prohibit
gang activity, weapon production, violence, suspicious or
preventable accidents, and other behavior prisons struggle
to bar. For example, prisoners might be required to break
up any fights as soon as possible on pain of losing their
own jobs.
It is to some extent inconsistent to speak of a
prisoner's freedom of contract when the prisoner loses his
liberty and other freedoms upon incarceration or when the
state intervenes in the market to support workers who are
then enabled to work for lower wages than if they were
required to provide their own food, clothing, shelter, and
health care. Thus, freedom of contract in the context of
prison labor is limited by the conditions of incarceration.
With an imprisoned workforce supported at state expense,
the market is never truly "free." All that can be done is to
inject more freedom of action into prison industries and
labor and try to benefit the public at large by getting
repealed crippling laws. The unequal bargaining position
of prisoners is inherent in their status as prisoners and in
reality provides pro-social forces greater power to
discipline them.
3. Immunity from Claims, Lawsuits, and
Prosecution. "Corporate tax liability, employee benefits,
tort litigation, [and] regulatory compliance .. . contribute to

the cost differential confronting manufacturers in the
United States." 1 2 3
Statutes, regulations, tort claims,

123 MFG.

INST., FACTS ABOUT MANUFACTURING 4, available at
http://www.themanufacturinginstitute.org/ResearchlFacts-About-
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required
employee
benefits,
lawsuits,
hearings,
investigations, government enforcement agencies, extra
procedures, forms, compliance activities, delayed personnel
decisions, and legal expenses drive up the cost of American
labor and send manufacturing jobs to lower-wage
countries.124 ,Structural costs in 2011 were 20 percent
higher than for our major competitors, up from 17.6 percent
in 2008. That cost differential excludes the cost of

labor."l

25

To prevent expensive litigation and compliance
costs, private and state prison industries should enjoy full
immunity from almost all lawsuits and claims.' 26
Employment laws, wage and hour legislation, insurance,
employee benefits, tort claims, and restrictions protecting
law-abiding workers should exempt prison labor industries,
with the exception of OSHA and scaled-back workers'
compensation for permanent injury, something similar to
Manufacturing/-/media/3EBE6A748B5B420E853B5216D4812847.ash
x.
124 Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird,
The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991); C.S.
Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business
Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1
(2004).
125 MFG.

INST.,

FACTS ABOUT MANUFACTURING

3, available at

http://www.themanufacturinginstitute.org/Research/Facts-AboutManufacturing/-/media/3EBE6A748B5B420E853B5216D4812847.ash
x.
126 See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992) (prisoner
performing janitorial, kitchen helper and similar duties directly for
Department of Corrections not entitled to minimum wage under Fair
Labor Standards Act; different results in other cases); Noah D. Zatz,
Working at the Boundariesof Markets: PrisonLabor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857
(2008) (complexity of potential claims discussed).
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the current federal Inmate Accident Compensation Act and
its promulgated regulations.1 27 American prison labor
should be legally considered (1) part of the sentence
imposed by the sentencing court, (2) required at the
discretion of the state as "involuntary servitude" without
compensation within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and (3) allowed gratuitously in the sole
discretion of the state under the proposed legislation. For
purposes of immunity from lawsuits, prisoners while
incarcerated should legally be considered involuntary
servants of the state. 128 Under the Thirteenth Amendment,
the state is arguably entitled to 100% of the value of
prisoners' labor, a principle bolstered by the state paying
for all of the prisoners' food, clothing, shelter, and health
care. That labor value belongs to all of the people and
ought to be equally available to all manufacturers and
service providers in the United States.
The Inmate Accident Compensation Act and its
promulgated regulations impose significant limitations
18 U.S.C. § 4126 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding
P.L. 113-34)). Under 28 C.F.R. § 301.318, "The Inmate Accident
Compensation system is not obligated to comply with the provisions of
any other system of worker's compensation except where stated in this
part." Other reasonable limitations are imposed on the inmates'
recovery, including factors such as minimum wage.
128 In 1977, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall cited a Virginia
decision that "[fjor much of this country's history, the prevailing view
was that a prisoner was a mere slave of the State, [who] not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords him." Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1977) (quoting Ruffin v.
Although antebellum
Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871)).
slaveholders were not required to pay their slaves, they often did to
increase production.
127
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upon monetary recoveries for on-the-job injuries by federal
inmates. "The Inmate Accident Compensation system is
not obligated to comply with the provisions of any other
system of worker's compensation . . . ."129 Imposed
limitations include only calculating impairment at the time
of release,' 30 withholding payment until release, 13 1
suspension of benefits if an inmate is re-incarcerated,1 32
and other limitations similar to those in most workers'
compensation laws. Prompt and simple determinations are
facilitated: initial determination is made by a claims
-134
examiner, 133 with
appeal to a committee.
Significantly,
Federal Prison Industries-the employer-controls the
accident compensation
process. 135
After almost fifty years, U.S. circuit courts are still
split on the question whether Title VII applies to convict
labor.136 Many other unresolved questions exist in prison
labor law. The legal uncertainties add greatly to potential
compliance costs, discouraging employment. The potential
compliance costs of labor laws and tort claims cause more
unemployment in prison than any good they could possibly
C.F.R. § 301.318 (LEXIS through 2013).
C.F.R. § 301.314(a) (LEXIS through 2013).
13' 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(a) (LEXIS through 2013).
132 28 C.F.R. § 301.316 (LEXIS through 2013).
13328 C.F.R. § 301.305 (LEXIS through 2013).
134 28 C.F.R. § 301.306 (LEXIS through 2013).
135See 28 C.F.R. §§ 301.302, -.313, -.317 (LEXIS through 2013).
136 Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Title VII Protectionsfor Inmates: A Model
Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America's Prisons, 111
129 28
130 28

COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1068 (2011).
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do. Whether or not prisoners and prison industries are
actually covered by specific labor laws, they must be
exempted from and granted immunity regarding
Prisoners
employment-related statutes and claims.
arguably do not deserve such protection, and many of their
civil rights are already removed by virtue of their
convictions and incarceration. Exemptions, even if not
legally necessary, are desirable and will prevent claims and
litigation regarding coverage and applicability. Immunity
will make unskilled and uneducated prison labor more
viable by reducing the labor burden. Across-the-board
elimination of worker benefits and protection, with a few
exceptions, would strengthen the hand of employers
attempting to control problematic prison labor.
Prison labor and industries should be specifically
exempted from and made immune from suit regarding the
Fair Labor Standards Act, Age Discrimination in
Pregnancy
Act,
Equal
Pay
Act,
Employment
Discrimination Act, Americans with Disabilities Act,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, National Labor Relations Act,
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) of 1959, all Civil Rights Acts, Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CPCA), Davis-Bacon Act, McNamaraO'Hara Service Contract Act, Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Walsh-Healey
Public Contracts Act, Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (MSPA), Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), Worker Adjustment and Retraining
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Act
(WARN),
Federal
Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA), Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act (except for modified
portions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act), Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare),
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Some
legislation such as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA), Railway Labor Act, Energy Employees
Compensation Program Act
Illness
Occupational
(EEOICPA), Radiation Exposure Compensation Act
(RECA), and the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) would
not need changing, as those environments are not suitable
for prison labor. To the long list above, immunity from tort
claims, unemployment insurance requirements, and
comparable state statutes should be added. Employers are
already immune from tort claims by virtue of workers'
compensation laws. A host of state laws need addressing,
on a state-by-state basis or with federal preemption.
Employers should not be required to provide benefits to
inmates that they otherwise provide to their nonincarcerated employees.
The mere listing of the statutes above, and
contemplation of additional state employment-related
statutes and tort claims, ought to inform the nation how
complex, cumbersome, and expensive employment and tort
laws have become relative to the rest of the world.
Difficulties of interpretation and the expenditures of time
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and legal expenses are even more burdensome in the
context of prison industries, where prisoners have a proven
record of filing a mountain of frivolous lawsuits, regulation
is spread across fifty-one jurisdictions, and the existing
legal framework is complicated and confusing in multiple
ways.
Few of these federal employment-related statutes
help prisoners now, and their existence harms prison
employment prospects.
Given the public's historical
disdain of prisoners, now is not the time to grant prisoners
the rights afforded under these laws, let prisoners imagine
they have such rights, or allow litigation over coverage. A
chief error of the PIECP was trying to bring prisoners up to
prevailing wage standards. The creation of a laissez-faire
employment regime would bypass the huge layer of
employment laws that make American labor substantially
more expensive than unprotected labor in foreign countries.
In the process, it would create an excellent laboratory to
test the value of the employment laws against a laissezfaire employment environment, one more similar to foreign
labor-management relations in developing nations. In the
prison context, the re-setting of the American employment
relationship back to employment-at-will ought to educate
the nation more fully on the advantages and disadvantages
of its employment regulations. Experience will determine
what employment protection prisoners need far better than
adapting generally inapplicable or unsuccessful legislation
Even without legal
to the correctional context.
requirements, "employers already largely accept and

53

Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 219
comply with their employment law obligations," 3 7 and this
would be true of most established corporations operating in
the prison context. Federal laws have changed attitudes
and norms in society, and their repeal in certain contexts
will not cause wholesale relapse.
Immunity from lawsuits would permit religious
organizations a greater role in establishing, funding, and
managing prison industries and workplaces in accordance
Hiring and
with their particular religious principles.
management practices based upon religious activity or
beliefs should be allowed because religion possesses the
power to transform lives and will inject morality into prison
systems. Businesses affiliated with particular religions
ought to be clothed with the same constitutional protection
otherwise allowed churches, mosques, synagogues, and
temples.
The power and authority of federal regulation of
interstate commerce relating to prison-made goods has
already been established by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761 and 1762
and comparable federal legislation. Federal law needs to
encourage and facilitate this interstate commerce instead of
blocking it. The best way is for Congress to preemptively
wipe the slate clean, admit the bankruptcy of its domestic
Smoot-Hawley regime, prevent states from imposing
restrictions on interstate commerce, and allow a fresh start.
If prison jobs that simply help run the prison or jail
are not counted, the huge edifice of federal and state
regulation of labor and industries, in and out of prison,
causes a market-productive prisoner unemployment rate of
about 90%. Because the existing legal structure has failed
137Noah

D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor
and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 857, 945 (2008).
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prisoners and prison industries, contracts must take the
place of the failed state and federal legislation. The
reformed legal environment of a very few applicable
employment-related laws and reliance upon contracts
would still be better for all interests than the involuntary
servitude contemplated and allowed by the first section of
the Thirteenth Amendment.
Full and enforceable immunity is necessary given
the volume of tort and statutory claims and suits that would
be filed if prisoners were allowed the opportunity. Indeed,
the primary reason for the Prison Litigation Reform Actl38
(PLRA) was the stupendous number of lawsuits filed by
prisoners, almost all of them frivolous or unfounded. The
PLRA succeeded in bringing a halt to the unprecedented
volume of frivolous prison litigation and might be
strengthened again to serve as a helpful vehicle to swiftly
deal with and reduce "jailbird lawsuits." Federal law
already limits recoveries by injured Federal Prison
Industries workers.139 The Inmate Accident Compensation
Act,14 not the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), is the
exclusive remedy against the government by a federal
prisoner with work-related injuries' 4 1 and might be retained
and made available to private businesses.
Legislatures and Congress chose to regulate prison
labor and industries with criminal statutes. 142 The use of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding
P.L. 113-34)).
139 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1142, 175 L.Ed.2d 973 (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding P.L. 113-34)).
140 18 U.S.C. § 4126.
141 United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Smith v. United
States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148
(2010).
142 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36
(excluding P.L. 113-34)).
13'
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criminal laws to regulate this trade had and still has a
chilling effect on anyone seeking to find any exceptions or
legal pathways through this complex, changing, and
confusing anti-competitive body of law and deters railroads
and transportation companies, too. Obviously, those anticompetitive criminal laws should be repealed, revised, or
federally preempted.
4. Mutual Rights of Return to General Prison
Population. Subject to their contracts, private and state
businesses should have the unfettered right to return

offending workers to the general prison population.
Likewise, prisoners could voluntarily return to the general
prison population in the event employers did not provide a
Clearly, the
better working or living environment.
draconian aspects of the Auburn System, such as enforced
silence, lock-step marching, and masks, would not reappear because employers would seek to retain their
workers. Many prisoners would naturally love to work in
an air-conditioned environment, which is not something
they enjoy in most prisons. Employment would be at-will,
subject to whatever contracts the employers and prisoners
made prior to the commencement of employment.
Contracts might provide that prisoners have to return to the
general prison population if they want to pursue a claim
against their employers and that their legal damages stop
accumulating once they leave their jobs.
5. Trust Accounts. Money earned by prisoners
would be put into a trust account, pending good behavior
and subject to claims for child support, victim restitution,
court costs, fines, and their own room and board in prison.
Deductions for federal, state, and local taxes, reasonable
charges for room and board, child and family support, and
victim restitution are already provided for and regulated in
18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)-TRANSPORTATION OR IMPORTATION
[OF PRISON-MADE GOODS]. If prison work pilot projects pay
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prevailing wages and are designated by the Director of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, then wages "subject to
deductions . . . shall not, in the aggregate, exceed 80 per
centum of gross wages." 4 3
Misbehavior by prisoners under contracts might
result in forfeiture of earnings on account of escape
attempts, violence, theft, strikes, work slowdowns, or other
violations of agreed rules and contacts. Prisoners would
undoubtedly behave to assure their continued employment
(and sometimes residence) in these better secure
Employers would more easily enforce
environments.
discipline and rules with the absolute discretion allowed to
relationship.
employers in an employment-at-will
Prisoners would then have an investment in their own good
behavior, learn pro-social skills, and develop healthy work
habits. Prisoners serving life without parole (or other long
sentences) should be able to spend earned money, while the
victims' families receive regular checks from those
earnings. Juries might determine the eligibility of victims'
families to receive these checks.
Deductions from the prisoner's paycheck for family
support, victim restitution, court costs, taxes, and the costs
of confinement could vary from state to state. Optimum
levels of deductions are yet to be determined. The states
would be free to experiment with different deduction
amounts and allocations. Something similar to the current
overall federal limitation permitting no more than 80% of
gross wages to be deducted seems wise; that overall limit
on deductions might best be enforced by federal preemptive
legislation.
6. Oversight. State and federal governments would
provide administrative and judicial oversight of prison
labor, industries, and contracts to assure prisoners received
their agreed compensation, were not abused, and did not
143

18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2).
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agree to unconscionable contractual provisions.
U.S.
magistrate judges already resolve lawsuits filed by federal
prisoners.
Existing federal mediation and arbitration
services could settle or decide disputes in the federal prison
system. States are increasingly encouraging alternative
dispute resolution, an expedited procedure appropriate for
disputes in the prison context.
7. Significantly Decrease Prison Population. A
common concern of those who are suspicious of business is
that, like in the convict leasing age, the legal system will
provide cheap labor by finding more criminals guilty and
increasing the length of prison sentences. This legitimate
concern is based upon (1) evidence that criminal
convictions fed the need for free or low-cost labor and
convict leasing regimes after the Civil War and for decades
thereafter;14 (2) current prison privatization, which merely

privatizes the warehouse function of incarceration and
provides to special interests the financial incentives to
increase prison populations; (3) the political strength of
private correctional corporations and correctional officers'
unions; and (4) the power of the courts to affect the supply
and demand for prison labor. Therefore, the opening up of
vibrant prison industries ought to include an increase in
alternative sentences such as drug treatment, proposed
judicial corporal punishment, 4 5 community service, parole,
probation, and other sentences short of incarceration.
The revitalization of prison industries does not
depend upon increasing the 2.25 million prisoners now
144 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME-THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
WORLD WARII (2008). The history of convict leasing instructs us on
what not to do.
145 See

J.D. Gleissner, Prison Overcrowding Cure: Judicial Corporal
Punishment of Adults, 49-4 CRIM. L. BULL. (2013) (author suggests
halving the U.S.
punishment).
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population
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behind American bars. The reduction of the American
prison population and the freeing of prison labor can
proceed simultaneously. Both would recognize that some
people in prison do not necessarily have to be there for the
betterment of society as a whole. Incarceration is not a
vital feature of the nation's republic. Incarceration as it is
now known did not exist when the U.S. Constitution was
written. The Declaration of Independence redirected the
most successful form of British punishment, transportation
of convicts, away from the Thirteen Colonies and toward
Australia.
8. Avoid Unfair Competition. Several steps can
be taken to reduce or eliminate unfair competition from
prison industries and labor. These options include one or
more of the following: (1) Competing employers should
have equal access to prison labor. This is one advantage of
eliminating convict leasing (or contracting for groups of
prisoners) by the prison system and allowing prisoners and
employers to make individual employment decisions. (2)
Prison industries could be limited to manufacturing goods
now exclusively made overseas or to domestic industries
under serious assault by foreign manufacturers and
processors. If only one American manufacturer made a
particular item in the United States, that manufacturer
could be allowed to hire prison labor. (3) Prison industries
might be required to prove that their prison employees
support existing employment in the free sector or re-shore
jobs to the United States. Union shops, for example, would
benefit from prison labor if their prison industry suppliers
sold goods and services to union shops at lower prices. (4)
The transfer of prison laborers from one prison system to
another can be facilitated, increasing industrial efficiency,
permitting more flexibility in hiring and plant locations,
and avoiding or lessening unfair competition on a regional
or distance basis. (5) Prison industries might be required to
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show that they were not displacing currently employed,
free American workers.
With the diversification of the world economy and
production methods, the off-shoring of manufacturing jobs,
and the limitations of incarceration, competition with
American labor and businesses outside prison will not be as
great as many perceive. Prison jobs under a reformed
regime will largely be low-skilled jobs, and the competition
for these jobs would not be as intense as with skilled
positions. Prisoners would not mix with free workers or
leave secure facilities. Prison labor cannot compete with
workers in mining, transportation, construction, power
generation and transmission, highly sophisticated
manufacturing, defense industries, or any dangerous
Anything that required work in changing
industry.
locations would be out of consideration for prison labor.
American jobs that have already moved overseas, including
less skilled positions, would not be endangered and in fact
might be brought back to the United States.
Today, work shirts, the subject of the Supreme
Court's 1936 decision in Whitfield v. State of Ohio, 46 are
almost all made overseas. Americans still make horse
collars, harnesses, and straps, the contested products in
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co.,1 47 but the leather industry has changed radically since
1937.
Production and supply have
from
moved
gradually
industrialized to developing
emerging
and
countries
economies, which are now
becoming major players in
146297
147

U.S. 431 (1936).
299 U.S. 334 (1937).
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the trade. In fact, developing
and emerging economies can
now manage the whole
supply chain on their own
and are fast becoming the
most important suppliers of
finished
value-added
products.
About 45% of
footwear, for example, is

made in China.148
Competition between foreign and U.S. labor dwarfs
any potential competition between free and incarcerated
labor in the United States. America must work harder and
smarter to remain the leading world power. All American
manufacturing jobs create U.S. tax revenues and additional
American employment, while manufacturing jobs lost to
foreign countries generally subtract from the U.S.
economy. Research, development, and engineering follow
manufacturing. The nation needs a free trade agreement
with itself. Clearly, jobs move overseas to lower-wage
countries, indicating the relative economic advantages of
lower wages. American prisoners would still be making
more money than wages in Vietnam, India, China, or
Pakistan ... and they would be making more money than
they are making right now.

Expected Results of Proposed Changes. Texas
A&M economist Dr. Morgan 0. Reynolds, former Chief
Economist at the U.S. Department of Labor, predicted, "If
148

Leather,

INT'L

TRADE

CENTRE,

http://www.intracen.org/exporters/leather/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2013);
see COMMODITIES & TRADE Div., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, WORLD STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM FOR RAW HIDES AND
SKINS, LEATHER AND LEATHER FOOTWEAR 1992-2011 (2011)

(unmistakable and growing dominance of developing countries over
developed countries).
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half of all prisoners worked in market-type jobs for five
years, earning $7 an hour in full-time employment, they
could boost the nation's gross domestic product by $20
billion. Prison-based industries would have a ripple effect
in their communities, as they tap local suppliers and other
services." 1 4 9 Additionally, tax receipts would rise. Prison
laborers should pay taxes and be subject to Social Security
because when they leave prison and grow old, they will be
asking for Medicare or Social Security benefits.
If federal and state statutes restricting prison labor
and private prison industries are swept away, freedom of
contract would create jobs in a circle around prisons. "An
increment to manufacturing production in the U.S. creates
more economic activity both within and outside the sector
than does a similar increment in any other major sector."15 0
Manufacturing generates a larger economic multiplier
If, for
effect than other sectors of the economy.''
example, 100,000 manufacturing jobs in prison were
generated, a manufacturing multiplier of 1.5 would create
an additional 150,000 jobs, for a total of 250,000 jobs.
Economists argue convincingly that the 1.5 manufacturing
multiplier significantly understates the true multiplying
Warren Richey, Made in USA . .. But by Convicts, CHRISTIAN SCI.
at
available
1998,
14,
Jan.
http://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0114/011498.us.us.4.html/(page)/2.
149

MONITOR,

15 JOEL POPKIN & KATHRYN KOBE, CO. FOR THE NAT'L Ass'N OF
MFRS. & THE NAM COUNCIL OF MFG. Ass'Ns, MANUFACTURING
RESURGENCE-A MUST FOR U.S. PROSPERITY (2010), available at

http://www.nam.org/System/Capture-Download.aspx?id=f36ec9f57bff-4da4-aeba-faab4b009b92.
"' MFG. INST., FACTS ABOUT MANUFACTURING

3 fig.2, available at

http://www.themanufacturinginstitute.org/-/media/1242121E7A4F45D
68C2A4586540703A5/2012FactsAboutManufacturingFullVer
sionHighRes.pdf.; Susan Helper et al., Why Does Manufacturing
Matter? Which ManufacturingMatters?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2012/0222_manufacturing-helper-kr
ueger-wial.aspx.
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effect of the manufacturing sector on the economy.152
Although prison labor would be unskilled at the outset, and
relatively low wages would produce a smaller
manufacturing multiplier, prisoners can boost productivity
the old-fashioned way by working longer hours. Ambitious
prisoners might, for example, work sixty hours per week at
two dollars per hour and thereby bring manufacturing jobs
back to the United States from lower-wage countries. 153
More convincing than mathematical projections is the
historical record of profitability enjoyed by American
prison systems in the nineteenth century.
Existing correctional industries owned by the state
could expand their markets to make and sell many more
different products or services to a greatly expanded base of
potential purchasers, in and out of the government. This
would undoubtedly boost their viability, make money for
the prison systems, put more prisoners to work, and have
Private businesses
more advantages in rehabilitation.
would provide stiff competition for state-run correctional
facilities. Each government could best determine its
preferred method of doing business.
Inevitably, private businesses would hire low-wage
prison labor to make goods now made in lower-wage
countries. The nation's competitive disadvantages relative
to developing nations would shrink, and the danger to
American manufacturing jobs would lessen. Consumer
goods now made exclusively overseas would more
Michael Mandel & Diana G. Carew, Manufacturing in the App
Economy: How Many Jobs Should We Aim For?, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y
INST., May 2012, at 1, available at http://progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/05.2012-MandelCarewManufacturing-inthe-App-Economyl.pdf.
1 One five-hour shift, followed by a five-hour rest period for naps,
would make the second daily five-hour shift much easier. Prisoners
would not have to commute, nor do they consume much time with
family, civic, or social matters.
152
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commonly be produced in the United States. Prison
businesses would retain workers by providing safer, more
comfortable, and more remunerative environments than
exist for prisoners today-and that would not often take
much extra effort. Organized labor would benefit by
increased economic activity, the circle of jobs created
around manufacturing plants, and the need of prison
industries to repair machines, transport goods, supply
goods and services, and generally participate in a more
vigorous economy.
A variety of business arrangements would arise.
Most correctional facilities have behind their fences and
walls unused land on which to build factories or are located
in rural areas with available land. Some private industries
might prefer to house, feed, and care for their own captive
labor force off the premises of existing state prisons but
still in secure facilities. Other industries would contract
with the state to rent existing or unused prison space.
Businesses might be required to lower the state's direct
incarceration costs or guarantee no increase in those costs.
Prisons could rent space or equipment and sell any items it
Plenty of used
produced to prison industries.
manufacturing equipment is available or in storage.
Overall, prison overcrowding and its attendant
problems would decrease. Prisoners would have a better
chance to support themselves when released from prison.
Prison violence would decrease. Prisoners serving life
without parole actually make some of the best workers if
they mature in prison. The American economy would
improve.
Because separate plants, workhouses, and work
communities of prisoners would provide a safer, better life
for prisoners, the behavior of prison workers would
improve. Behavior in the general prison population would
also improve as prisoners vied for jobs. Religious activity
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would increase, and religious organizations would play a
greater role than they do currently.
A hard core of incorrigible, insane, disabled,
dangerous, sick, and lazy prisoners and gang members
would remain in the general prison population, death row,
or solitary confinement. Employers would know whom to
hire and whom to promptly send back. If they misbehaved,
prisoners would instantly lose their jobs, some or all of
their trust account savings, and get sent back to the general
prison population. Today, there are not nearly enough jobs
for prisoners, and the scarcity of jobs would likely continue
for years even if the protectionist regime fell.
Recidivism would decline once prisoners learned to
work very hard in a private business, saved money for their
releases, controlled their behaviors better as required by
their employment contracts and authoritative employers,
and stayed away from the corroding influences of the worst
criminals. Even a small drop in recidivism has a very
positive effect on the general economy. 154 Rehabilitation
prospects advance with hard work, contributions to the
larger society, and recognition of the monetary rewards
from hard work.' 5 5 Crime victims would benefit by
increased restitution payments, just as families would
benefit by increased child and family support income. The
economic and social costs of incarceration would decrease.
CONCLUSION

Nations do not prosper by putting millions of ablebodied workers in cages with nothing to do. This nation
did not achieve its world position by discouraging hard
work, letting foreign nations work harder and smarter, or
by letting the government assume ever larger portions of its
154 Levitt,

supra note 114.
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economy and daily lives. Freedom, mutually beneficial
exchanges, hard work, innovation, and enormous resources
made America what is considered the leading economy in
the world. Each of the fifty-one governments has a
valuable labor resource it does not fully employ. In the
context of prison industries, the nation must re-affirm the
importance of hard work, private enterprise, less
government control, freedom of contract, and competition.
Economic and social conditions, standing in the world, and
the enormous growth in the nation's prison, jail, and
correctional populations all urge the creation of
manufacturing jobs.
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